Which layer of the AI industry actually bears the cost of each proposal
Washington processes AI as one industry with one set of asks. It isn't one industry. There are at least four — the frontier that sells capability, the apps that sell workflow and buy inference, the hyperscalers that sell capacity, and the chips that sell the silicon underneath all of it. Their interests are diverging fast, and every policy on the table picks among them whether or not anyone says so.
The method is to place a company by where its revenue comes from, not by what it says it is building. The gap between the two is often large. xAI presents as a frontier lab and is understood in Washington as a peer to OpenAI and Anthropic, but its disclosed revenue comes substantially from renting Colossus capacity to Anthropic — a competitor's frontier lab as its anchor tenant. Google's capital is visibly moving from capability toward capacity, with third-party AI cloud revenue and TPU sales projected far above Gemini's. When these companies lobby, the income statement is talking, not the mission statement.
Once the layers are visible, positions that read as philosophy resolve into positioning. An argument that closed frontier leads are dangerous tends to come from a company without one. An argument that copying frontier models is dangerous tends to come from a company with one. Both risks are real; each happens to be the risk that would damage the arguer's employer. The same pattern runs through open weights, distillation, export controls, and datacenter siting, where identical patriotic vocabulary is used by layers in direct opposition — the chip layer's China argument opposes the export controls that the frontier layer's China argument demands.
Taxation is where the layer differences stop being rhetorical. Nearly every economic proposal on the map agrees on the spending side: money should reach displaced workers. The disagreement is almost entirely about the tax base, and the base is the whole policy. A tax on tokens consumed sounds like a tax on AI companies but is a tax on AI buyers, landing on the app layer and its enterprise customers while leaving frontier training compute untouched — a tax on diffusion, which sits awkwardly against the argument that diffusion is where the economic gains come from. A change to capital treatment lands on whoever owns the machines, which means the hyperscalers. Claims on enterprise value are the only family of instruments aimed squarely at the frontier. Industry assessments like Kelly's Horizon Fund name a payer without naming a base at all, and each possible answer sends the bill to a different layer.
Two absences are as informative as anything on the matrix. No proposal taxes training compute specifically, which is the one instrument that would fall on the frontier layer alone. And nothing reaches the chip layer except export controls, which are framed as national security rather than as revenue. The largest single concentration of AI wealth is the least exposed to every economic proposal in circulation.
The sharpest coalition line is not open versus closed. It is whether a company sells capability or sells capacity, because those two want opposite things from time. Capability wants speed. Capacity wants predictability and a contract long enough to underwrite the build. Chips want volume and are agnostic about who supplies it, which makes them a free agent in every fight.
Place a company by where the revenue comes from, not by what it says it is building
Sells capability and lead time
Trains and sells access to the most capable models. Its asset is the margin between what it can do and what everyone else can do, which is an asset that depreciates continuously and has to be re-earned every release cycle.
Winning looks like: Protect the lead margin, keep capital flowing, keep model outputs from being freely copied, and accept regulation that raises the cost of entry.
OpenAI · Anthropic · Google DeepMind · Meta Superintelligence Labs · xAI · Mistral
Sells workflow and distribution
Buys inference and sells the thing built on top of it. Includes the inference middlemen — the serving providers that make model-switching cheap — who have the strongest interest in commoditization of anyone, and every incumbent bolting AI onto existing software.
Winning looks like: Cheap, abundant, interchangeable inference. Model commoditization is the business plan, and anything that entrenches a single lab is a threat.
Harvey · Cursor · Abridge · Sierra · Glean · Baseten and Fireworks
Sells capacity
Builds and rents the compute. Carries almost all of the physical exposure in AI policy — land, power, water, and local politics — and needs demand contracted far enough out to justify a build that outlasts several model generations.
Winning looks like: Durable contracted demand, fast permitting, cheap power, favorable capital treatment, and enough political cover to keep building in American communities.
Microsoft · Amazon · Google Cloud · Oracle · Meta's internal fleet · CoreWeave and the neoclouds
Sells silicon for training and inference
Supplies the hardware every other layer runs on. Indifferent to which model wins and hostile to anything that concentrates purchasing in a few hands, which makes it a free agent in fights the other three treat as existential.
Winning looks like: Total token volume, as many independent buyers as possible, and the largest addressable market including export markets.
Nvidia · AMD · Broadcom · TSMC · Google's TPU program
Which layer bears the cost of each proposal, and the base it is assessed on
| Proposal | Frontier | Apps | Hyperscalers | Chips | Base assessed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WH Framework | — | Indirect | Secondary | — | Data center electricity cost allocation; age assurance |
| WH AI EO | Indirect | — | — | — | None — the order forecloses mandatory obligations |
| WH SI Accord | Indirect | — | — | — | None — voluntary commitments by six signatories |
| Blackburn | Primary | Primary | Indirect | — | Developer and deployer conduct; Section 230 repeal |
| OpenAI/Lehane | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier model developers, via mandatory pre-deployment testing |
| OpenAI Industrial | Secondary | Indirect | Primary | Secondary | Capital ownership, via modernized taxation of capital over labor |
| OpenAI Blueprint | Primary | — | — | Secondary | Frontier developers above a capability threshold; export controls |
| Anthropic Framework | Primary | — | — | — | Developers above 10^25 training operations that also exceed $500M in AI revenue or $1B a year in AI R&D |
| Anthropic Draft Bill | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier developers above 10^25 operations; large frontier developers above $500M in AI revenue or $1B in AI development spending |
| CHT Roadmap | Primary | Primary | Secondary | Indirect | Product liability; engagement-driven design; capital expenditure |
| ARI Blueprint | Primary | — | — | — | Developers that have trained a model at 10^26 operations and spent at least $100M on AI training in the past year |
| Warner | Secondary | Secondary | Primary | — | Data center bonus depreciation, conditioned on efficiency standards |
| AI Risk Management and Security Act | Primary | — | Secondary | — | Developers of frontier models defined by dangerous capability rather than compute, plus providers of those models for incident reporting |
| Cantwell | Primary | Secondary | — | Secondary | Undefined 'covered models' capable of catastrophic harm; deployers in consequential decisions; export controls |
| Thune–Klobuchar | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier developers (threshold not yet public) |
| Bores AI Dividend | Primary | Primary | Primary | Indirect | Tokens consumed; AI capital depreciation; frontier enterprise value |
| Kelly | ? | ? | ? | ? | Unchosen — the Horizon Fund names a payer and three candidate bases, but picks none |
| Sanders | Primary | Indirect | Primary | Secondary | Frontier development and data center buildout, via moratorium |
| Khanna | Secondary | Primary | Primary | Indirect | Labor-displacing token use; AI capital; data generation; wealth |
| DC Bill of Rights | Indirect | — | Primary | Indirect | Data center siting, power, water, and local tax subsidies |
| Casar AI Tax | Primary | Secondary | Indirect | Indirect | Tokens processed and AI service revenue, assessed on the model developer |
| Gallego | Secondary | Primary | Primary | Indirect | Data center gross receipts; employers that automate; a menu of token and AI-revenue taxes |
| CA SB 53 | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier developers above a $500M revenue threshold |
| Newsom EO | Indirect | — | — | — | None directly — state agencies; the proposals it commissions target large frontier developers |
| Illinois SB 315 | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier developers above 10^26 operations with more than $500M in revenue |
| NY RAISE | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier developers above a $500M revenue threshold |
| Shapiro Data Center EO | Indirect | — | Primary | Indirect | AI data center projects seeking Pennsylvania permits, grid service, or the data center equipment tax exemption |
| Abbott Data Center Audit | Indirect | — | Primary | Indirect | Data center projects seeking connection to the ERCOT grid |
| GAAIA | Primary | Secondary | — | — | Frontier developers above $500M; employers conducting AI-driven layoffs |
| FRONTIER Act | Primary | — | — | — | Frontier developers above 10^26 operations, tiered by revenue and AI development spending |
| Kill Switch Act | Primary | Secondary | Secondary | — | Operators serving systems trained with >$100M of compute and earning ≥$500M a year from them |
| AI Agent Accountability Act | Primary | Secondary | — | — | Developers and operators of AI agents that cause CFAA-covered damage or loss |
| CLAIM Act | Primary | Indirect | — | — | Developers of AI systems that injure third parties |
| National AI Charter | Primary | Primary | Primary | Secondary | Every company operating in AI in the United States, chartered and supervised as a firm |
Primary is the layer an instrument is actually assessed on; secondary a real but non-target burden; indirect a cost reached only by pass-through. A ? means the proposal names a payer without defining a base, so its incidence cannot be determined from the text.
All proposals in this analysis